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Abstract— This paper proposes multi-key encryption scheme and
engine architecture (MKE) that increases security and optimizes
energy efficiency of sensor networks, while minimizing
modifications to existing implementations. The scheme improves
security of AES against correlation power analysis (CPA) attack
by employing MKE engine, breaking the correlation between
power consumption and the used key. Other schemes utilize
complex hardware designs, for example by using the
inhomogeneous s-boxes that reduce energy efficiency of the
engine. In contrast, the proposed hardware engine uses a
randomly sequence of few keys to encode subsequent blocks of a
messages. Additionally, the scheme improves security of AES
against brute-force attacks for a given key size by utilizing
multiple keys to encrypt subsequent blocks of a message. In
contrast, a typical security upgrade would require a larger key
size and encryption engine, which would increase cost and energy
consumption of the devices. Both analytical and simulation
results are presented in this paper.

tradeoff between the security, energy efficiency, and cost
requires a different approach than a simple increase of the key
size.

Keywords— Wireless sensor networks (WSN), Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), Correlation power Analysis (CPA),
key pre-distribution.

A. Background and Related Work
The proposed scheme aims at thwarting different attacks
on AES algorithm while minimizing necessary changes to the
encryption engine implementation. The scheme should be
used in conjunction with a key distribution scheme that
provides the nodes with sufficient number of keys. Many
distribution algorithms [1][2] have been developed and can be
used with the proposed scheme, for example Eschenauer and
Gligor [3] have developed random key pre-distribution
protocols in which a random subset of keys from a large pool
of symmetric keys is loaded to each node have to find one
common key from their subsets which will be used as shared
secret key for protecting their communication. The
Eschenauer-Gligor scheme has been progressively improved
[4][5][6]. For example, Du et al. [5] proposed the DDHV (Du,
Deng, Han, and Varshney) scheme. The DDHV scheme is
based on a multiple key space scheme generated from Blom’s
[7] λ-secure symmetric key generation system, which is
randomly assigned to each sensor node in the network.
Schemes using random distribution of keys are proposed with
different approach techniques to distribute keys among nodes
based on different metrics like security, memory, and energyefficiency. Also, similar mechanisms have been proposed for
heterogeneous WSNs [8][9].

I. INTRODUCTION
The wireless sensor networks are increasingly employed in
various applications, for example border security with sensors
to detect intrusions, drinking water contamination detection
around the water collection point. The secure communication
in such networks becomes increasingly important. The system
should prevent unauthorized access, tampering with the
systems, and other malicious activities. However, the WSN
poses several specific challenges related to security. First, a
typical WSN consists of hundreds or thousands of batterypowered sensing devices. Hence, the sensor mote’s cost and
energy consumption have to be minimized in order to make
the WSNs viable for commercial applications. Second, the
limited processing capabilities prevent from utilizing complex
and computationally intensive encryption algorithms.
However, the required security level increases over time with
the computational power available to attackers. Consequently,
the ever-improving processor’s speed and capabilities force
the sensor designer to increase the size of encryption key thus
increasing cost and energy consumption of the devices. Hence,
a simple increase of key size is not suitable to handle the
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In contrast, the proposed scheme employs multiple keys to
improve the overall security. The proposed scheme uses these
keys in a random sequence to encrypt a particular message.
Hence, if attacker discovers a single key then only a fraction
of the message is compromised. Consequently, all the keys
have to be compromised before the link becomes unsecure.
Moreover, the order and the id of the particular key used are
hidden from attacker since the keys are selected randomly and
switched on a block-by-block basis instead of per packet or
per link basis. The proposed scheme can be applied in any
communication network with AES as encryption algorithm, to
improve security against CPA attacks. However, it is
especially suitable to memory constrained, energy-limited
wireless sensor networks.

937

Authorized licensed use limited to: Missouri University of Science and Technology. Downloaded on March 25,2010 at 12:29:49 EDT from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.

In general, sensor nodes will either have to be powered by
small nonrenewable batteries or use a modest amount of
energy harvested from the environment, for example from
solar panel. However, the amount of available energy in both
approaches is limited thus thwarting node operational
capabilities. Hence, developing energy-efficient cryptographic
algorithms and methods is a critical issue in designing
protocols for wireless sensor networks, including the security
schemes. The sensors’ resource constraints, coupled with their
limited knowledge of the topology within which they are
deployed, render public-key-infrastructure-(PKI) based
schemes inappropriate for wireless sensor networks. Some
existing studies suggest storing the master key in tamperresistant memory to reduce the risk [10] [11]. However, there
exist attacks that do not require direct access to the memory
with the secret key. For example, CPA attack exploits
knowledge of hardware implementation of AES to determine a
key value using energy signatures.
Power analysis attacks pose a serious threat to
implementations of cryptographic algorithms since the
attacker does not have to gain access to protected memory. A
practical power analysis attack method has been demonstrated
[12] [13]. There exist strategies to protect a device against
such an attack, for example by masking the intermediate
results [14]. However, the existing approaches often require
significant modification to the encryption engines [15] and
increase energy consumption [16]. For example, a set of
different, energy-suboptimal S-Box implementations can be
used to hide the key at the cost of higher energy consumption
[16]. In contrast, the proposed scheme allows selecting the
most energy efficient AES implementation while
counteracting CPA attacks by rotating available keys. Each
key has a different energy signature, thus breaking correlation
between energy consumption and a key value. Hence, the
proposed scheme ensures the CPA attacks fails.
This paper presents analysis of the security improvements
of the proposed multi-key encryption scheme using the AES
cipher. The AES is a symmetric block cipher standard, which
was issued by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) in 2001 [17]. However, it has to be noted
that the proposed scheme does not dependent on a specific
cipher since the theoretical analysis does not assume usage of
AES. Existing multi–key schemes aim at improving the
security against the brute force attack by increasing the
effective key length. For example the Triple-DES [18] uses
the three keys on each block of data subsequently. In contrast,
the proposed scheme counters both the CPA and brute force
attacks by using a randomly selected key for each block.
Consequently, the attacker does not have information which
key was used to encrypt the particular block.
The proposed scheme increases the security of AES
algorithm with minimal modifications to the hardware design
and without any changes to the AES methodology. It is
assumed that the keys are available at the sensor nodes. An
existing key management schemes [1][2][3][4][5][6][7] can be
utilized to satisfy that assumption.

Remark: The dynamic key distribution schemes
contribute to communication and power overhead of the whole
network. Hence, the future work will include an extended
performance analysis of the proposed scheme including the
impact of a key management scheme. However, for clarity this
work focuses on the analysis of the security aspects of the
proposed scheme.
The main contributions of this paper are: (1) novel AES
engine architecture that can utilize multiple keys to increase
security, (2) theoretical analysis of the performance of the
proposed scheme, and (3) a simple and energy-efficient
hardware model for implementing the proposed scheme. The
paper is organized as follows: in Section II, the main types of
attacks on AES algorithm are discussed. Next, the proposed
multiple-key encryption technique is presented in Section III.
In Section IV, the theoretical analysis of proposed technique is
given. Finally, the simulation results for power correlation
attack are presented in Section V.
II. SECURITY ATTACKS
In this paper, the performance analysis is conducted with
regards to two types of attacks: (a) the CPA and (b) the bruteforce attack on AES scheme. First the details of the attack
technique are given, in order to gain understanding how the
proposed scheme improves the security.
A. Correlation Power Analysis Attack
The CPA attack exploits the correlation between energy
consumption of the circuit and the data processed on it. Often,
it is assumed that the circuit’s power consumption varies
linearly with the bit-wise difference in the processed data
[12][13]. For example, if a register bit changes value, the
energy consumed is different than if the bit value does not
change. For the particular S-Box design, the attacker can
analyze correlation between power signatures and the pair of a
plain text and a key. When the encryption is repeated for a
sufficient number of plaintexts the statistical correlation with
simulated keys can be calculated. The key with the highest
correlation is considered to be the secret key. Moreover, this
method is noninvasive since the attacker does no need to
access and read the memory with the key, which often is
protected [10][11].
Next, the analysis of CPA attack is performed for the
partial key Ks for simplicity. However, the results are valid for
the retrieval of the whole key since the method can be
repeated to retrieve the other partial keys. For AES, the CPA
attacker analyses power signatures for the first and last round
of the encryption process. For the CPA attack, a predictable
power consumption model is considered:
W

, PT

(1)

where WS(j) is the power consumption for plaintext j, KS is a
partial key, PT(j) is the jth random plaintext, and W is a
function of power dissipation. Given N plaintexts, the
predicted power WS(j) can be derived using (1), and the
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corresponding power traces calculated. In general, the CPA
assumes that power consumption is proportional to number of
bits changed in S-Box register. In other words, the power is
proportional to Hamming distance [21]. To simplify the
analysis while not losing generality, it is assumed that the
register, R is initialized to zero (0). Consequently, the power
consumed can be expressed as
W = a ⋅ H (D) + b ⋅ D

(2)

where a is a scalar gain between the Hamming distance, H,
and the power consumed, W. The current and previous states
of the S-Box register are expressed as D and R respectively, b
is power dissipation induced by noise offsets, and time
dependent components in a 128-bit random key. If D contains
m independent and uniformly distributed bits, the whole word
has an average hamming weight μ=m/2 and a variance
σ2=m/4. Hence, the correlation coefficient between W and
H(D) is equal to:

Current practice is to use a 128-bit AES key. Hence, the
total number of different keys is equal to 3.4 x 1038. Table 1
illustrates how long it takes to break the AES key using brute
force attack. The current results are contrasted with the results
from 1995. Additionally, Table 2 shows the decrease in
hardware costs per 1000 (millions instructions per second)
MIPS [19][20]. Hence, it can be inferred that the security of
the AES decreases with time for the same key size.
In conclusion, a simple remedy of increasing key size
might increase security against brute-force attacks but for
WSNs due to resource limitations in terms of memory, battery
power a different approach is needed. The proposed scheme
modified architecture of the encryption engine to utilize
multiple shorter keys. The security of the proposed scheme
increases without need for larger encryption engines. The
analytical results are presented in Subsection IV.B.
TABLE 1. COST AND TIME ESTIMATION FOR A BRUTE FORCE
ATTACK

Machine cost

ρ wH

E(H (D)W ) − E(H (D))E(W)
a m
=
=
σ (H(D))σ (W )
ma2 + 4σ b2

$300M
$300K
$10K

(3)

Key Search Time in
2009
15
9.37 x 10 years
24
6.52 x 10 years
36
7.42 x 10 years

Key Search Time in
1995
23
4.52 x 10 years
33
5.6 x 10 years
Infeasible

When a partial key guess, Ks, is considered then
TABLE 2. HARDWARE COST OF PROCESSING POWER
P = PT S ⊕ K S

where PTs denotes the corresponding partial plaintexts. If PTs
contains n independent and uniformly distributed bits, it has
an average μ=n/2 and a variance σ2=n/4. Consequently, the
correlation between W and P is expressed as:
ρ wH

E(H (P)W )− E(H (P))E(W)
a n
=
=
σ (H (P))σ (W )
na2 + 4σ b2

Corresponding year
1961
1997
2007

(4)

(5)

According to above discussion, the partial key guess is correct,
if the intermediate results and the power consumption are
correlated, that is the highest correlation coefficient is
achieved for that key.
B. Brute Force Attack
The brute force attack is a simple type of attack though
requires relatively large effort. The attacker decrypts the
cipher text trying every possible key. Assuming the attacker
can identify if the decrypted value is the correct ones, the
technique requires on average to decrypt half of the total
number of possible keys. Hence, for a sufficiently long key the
brute force attack becomes impractical. However, the everimproving performance of modern processing systems quickly
ages and weakens the security of AES for a given key size, as
shown in Table 1. Simple remedy is to increase key size in par
with technical capabilities of a potential attacker. However, in
case of resource limited sensor nodes the added memory,
processing, and power requirements become prohibitive.

Hardware cost/1000MIPS
$1.1 trillion
$30,000
$0.42

III. MULTI-KEY ENCRYPTION TECHNIQUE
The proposed encryption scheme utilizes multiple keys to
encrypt plaintext using AES algorithm. The subsequent blocks
of plain text are encrypted using randomly selected keys. In
contrast, the standard AES uses a single key to encrypt the
whole plaintext. The proposed scheme increases security when
compared with the single key approach since complete
decryption can be done only with all utilized keys.
Remark: Though the proposed scheme provides uniform
security to all data, it is possible to vary the security level (e.g.
number of used keys) based on requested protection. In such
cases, MKE scheme can be adjusted to use more number of
keys for high priority data and fewer keys for low priority
data. Also, the routing may vary with requested protection
level in order to avoid links with too few keys.
The improved security is achieved with minimal
modifications to the AES engine and small increase of
complexity and energy. Moreover, the message content is
protected even if the intruder compromises few of the shared
keys since part of the message will be still protected with the
rest of keys. The detailed analysis is presented in Section IV.
The packet is encrypted such that only the destination node
can decrypt the data with the corresponding shared keys. The
original message is pre-pended with two fields: the first key
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ID and a seed, as shown in Fig. 1.

Decryption process is shown in Fig. 3. Note that an
additional processing overhead is introduced when decrypting
the first block since the correct key has to be found. Once the
first block is decrypted the subsequent blocks are decrypted
using keys dictated by the pseudo-random generator.
Moreover, in order to minimize the initial overhead, the
encoding of the subsequent packets can continue using the
same pseudo-random sequence. Then the decoder when using
the same sequence will start the key search using the correct
one. Hence, no processing overhead will be incurred.

Figure 1. Data payload of a packet
A. Synchronization of Radom Key Sequences
The Key ID and seed fields are utilized for the
synchronization purposes. When the destination receives the
message it needs to first synchronize the pseudo random
generator with the source in order to discover the appropriate
sequence of keys. Hence, the first block of the message is
decrypted using each shared key until the correct key is found,
that is when the message’s key ID matches the one of the
applied key.
When the right key is found for the first block the
subsequent blocks are decrypted only once using the correct
sequence of keys selected by the pseudo random generator.
Also, the same random generator is applied for the subsequent
messages in order to reduce the overhead of trying all the
shared keys for the first block of every message.
Moreover, the loss of synchronization between transmitter
and receiver, for example due to lost packets and
retransmission, can easily be detected. The receiver node
compares ‘key id’ and ‘seed’ fields from each message with
the random generator sequence. The match confirms a
successful synchronization and the rest of message can be
decrypted. Otherwise, the synchronization procedure is
repeated using the first block, as described above.

Figure 3. Decryption Module
The existing approaches require significant modification to
the encryption engines [16], or use less energy efficient
designs [15]. In contrast, the proposed scheme can utilize the
S-Boxes with the lowest power consumption that increases
energy-efficiency when compared to other schemes [15][16].
Moreover, the security is increased for the same key and
cipher size. Next, the analytical and simulation results are
presented.
IV. THEORETICAL SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED
MKE SCHEME
The security of the proposed multi-key encryption (MKE)
scheme is analyzed against the CPA attack and also the bruteforce attack. The quantitative results and improvements are
presented in next subsections.

Figure 2. Encryption Module
The encryption process of the proposed MKE scheme is
illustrated in Fig. 2. The plaintext data blocks (e.g. 128, 156 or
192 bits long) are encrypted with the key chosen by the
pseudo-random key selector module. The first encrypted block
includes the key id and random generator’s seed that are
necessary to recreate the same key sequence at both
transmitter and receiver. Moreover, these values are selected
randomly and never transmitted in plain. Hence, the attacker
is unable to acquire them.

A. CPA Attack
Assume that CPA attack on 8 MSBs (Most Significant Bit)
of the registers shown in Fig. 4. The key used for this
operation is the original key for encryption, N random
plaintexts and one fixed but random key have been chosen for
the experiment, the total number of bit-changes between the
previous and the current values of these M MSBs of the
register for the initial key addition are calculated.
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Figure 4: Simplified diagram of AES algorithm
By employing the proposed MKE scheme the correlation
between power values with respect to cipher key is broken and
correlation coefficients values are reduced. The proposed
engine architecture is shown in Figs. 5 and 6. If an attacker
employs the CPA method to compromise the secret key, the
exact key cannot be decoded since the correlation between the
power and the secret key is broken.
Let us consider scenario where two keys are used. Their
partial keys are ks1 and ks2 respectively. Then corresponding
power values are expressed as
P1 = PT S ⊕ K S1

(6)

Figure 6. Modified Architecture for AES Encryption
The correlation can be calculated from (5). When the
attacker encrypts N plaintexts, it can calculate correlation
between the corresponding power usage for each plaintext and
the simulated power consumption of the same plaintexts. The
attacker needs to calculate the correlation for every key
combination. For a particular key the correlation values are
summed up for all plaintexts:

P2 = PT S ⊕ K S 2

ρ k = ρ wp 1 + ρ wp 2 + ... + ρ wpN ≅ N ⋅ ρ wp

(7)

where p1,p2,…,pN denote the keys used with each plaintexts.
Theorem 1: The correlation factor value decreases with
number of employed keys.
Proof: The claim of the Theorem 1 is analyzed for two
cases: with two and M keys. In short, the combined correlation
factor obtained for multiple keys is smaller compared to the
correlation factor obtained when employing one key over N
plaintexts.
1) Case 1: Encryption using two keys
First, a case with two keys used for encryption is
considered. The keys are randomly used to encrypt N
subsequent message blocks. Let n k1 and n k2 denotes the
number of blocks encrypted with the key k1 and k2
respectively. Now the correlation factor is equal to

ρk = nK1 ⋅ ρwp1 +nK2 ⋅ ρwp2 = nK1 ⋅ ρwp1 +(N −nK1 )⋅ ρwp2

Figure 5. Modified Architecture for AES Encryption
Algorithm

(8)

where ρwp1 and ρ wp 2 are the correlation factors corresponding
to keys k1 and k2. The difference in correlation factor value
due to implementation of multiple keys can be expressed as:
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(9)

whole message until every key used for encryption is
compromised.

where N > n k1 , and Δρ k is the difference between correlation
factors when single key and multiple keys are used. If the
difference factor is positive, then correlation factors get altered
such that exact key used cannot be found.

Consider an attacker who compromised k out of N keys.
Now, the attacker has to select a key each time from the group
of known k keys for every cipher text block, then the
probability of selection a key is

[

Δρ k = N ⋅ ρ wp1 − n k1 ⋅ ρ wp1 + (N − n k1 ) ⋅ ρ wp2

]

For example, in Fig. 7, the key at I=156 has the highest
correlation coefficient ρ wp1 averaged over N rounds. If a
different key is used for encryption and averaged over N
rounds the correlation for I=156, denoted as ρ wp 2 , is always
lesser than the ρ wp1 from the first encryption instance since
second key will have its peak at other time instance. So, using
both keys subsequently decreases the overall correlation
coefficient value for N rounds.
Overall, the following conditions hold: N > n k1 and
ρ wp1 > ρ wp 2 . Consequently, the first difference of correlation

factor Δρ k is always positive which shows that the final
correlation values decrease if two keys are used.
2) Case 2: General formulation for M keys
Following the analysis from the case 1, the correlation
factor difference for M keys can be expressed as:

[

Δρ k = N ⋅ ρ wp1 − n k1 ⋅ ρ wp1 + n k2 ⋅ ρ wp2 + ... + n kM ⋅ ρ wpM

]

Pcorrect = (1− P (k)) L

B. Brute Force Attack
The proposed scheme uses random sequence of N keys to
encrypt block plaintext using AES algorithm. Hence, if k keys
out of N are compromised, the attacker does have to have
sufficient information to determine the sequence used to
encrypt the message blocks. In this technique the keys are
selected randomly and attacker uses every key out of the
known k keys to decrypt the cipher text for every cipher text
block. The number of trials increases with number of blocks in
the message and number of known keys, k. Moreover, only a
fraction of a message is decrypted, as he knows only few out
of total number of keys.
In order to find the correct 128-bit key the attacker needs
to consider all 2128 possible keys. In terms of probability the
−128
probability of selecting a correct key is equal to P = 2 . The
probability of finding the particular key by brute force, P(T),
can be expressed as
(11)

In the MKE scheme, each block is encrypted using
randomly selected key out of the N shared ones. Hence, even
if intruder compromises few keys, it is not possible to decode

(13)

where L denotes the number of trials to be performed for each
message block to decrypt it until attacker finds the correct key
from the known group of keys and it has a maximum value of
k (i.e., total number of keys known by the intruder).
The final probability becomes lower than P(T) in (11),
where only one key is used. The final probability P final , is the
product of P(k) and Pcorrect and is given by
P final = P (k) ⋅ Pcorrect

M

(12)

Probability of finding exact key from known k keys out of
N keys until correct key is found is given as:

(14)

(10)

where N = i=1 n ki . The ρ wp1 is the highest correlation when
compared to the other M-1 keys. Hence, the Δρ k difference is
always positive.

P(T ) = (1− P)T P

⎛k ⎞ ⎛N ⎞
P (k ) = ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ = (k N)
⎝ 1⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠

where P final denotes final probability of finding the correct
key for each plaintext block and it denotes increase in security,
even if some of the keys out of k keys are compromised
attacker has to check each time for the correctness of the key,
which results in time consumption as well as only partial
detection of the whole message.
Remark: It has to be noted that the proper design of the
random generator (RNG) is required to ensure that attacker
cannot finding the order of the keys and thus predict which
one is used for each block. A weak RNGs are known to
undermine otherwise strong security mechanisms [22] [23].
The percentage of total message decrypted is proportional
to number of k keys known to intruder out of N keys
P( percent) ∝ k / N

(15)

The proposed scheme increases the security by using
multiple-keys. The security increases proportionally to the
number of used keys.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Simulation has been conducted in Matlab to analyze the
performance of the proposed MKE schemes in thwarting the
CPA attack. Attack on a partial 8-bit key is studied. However,
the results can be easily expanded to the general case of L-bit
key. It is assumed that the attacker simulates encryption
engine for the g=256 keys (for 8-bit partial key/register). The
attacker collects the power signatures for N=1000 plaintexts,
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each plaintext representing a block of message data. Then, the
correlation factors for (N x g) cases are calculated and
averaged for the N=1000 plaintexts. The results are presented
based on reference to the respective keys. The key with
highest correlation is expected to be the secret key used for the
actual encryption. The proposed technique uses multiple keys
subsequently for N plaintexts, which results in the reduced
correlation.
Remark: In CPA attack, the complexity of attack
increases with number of plaintexts, N. Also, the confidence
of finding the correct key increases with number of plaintexts,
N, since the individual correlation coefficients of N plaintexts
are being summed up. However, the confidence saturates at
some level due to noise in measurements and quality of the
power correlation for the given circuitry. Furthermore, in case
of the MKE scheme, the signal correlation reduces when
compared to a single key scheme since the random selection
of keys breaks the correlation between power consumption
and the key. This tradeoff between increasing complexity and
saturating confidence leads to a practically justifiable size of
the plaintext set, N. Henceforth, the N=1000 value is typically
considered for this experiment[15][16].
Fig. 7 illustrates the raw correlation factors for a single key
scenario [16]. It exhibits a high correlation with the secret key
that was used during the actual encryption. In contrast, for
MKE scheme the correlation between secret key and
correlation coefficients decrease with number of used keys, as
shown in Figs. 8 and 9. The main reason is that the subsequent
blocks are encrypted with different keys, which power
correlation with the simulated results for a single key
decreases.

Figure 7. The correlation coefficients for one key [17]

Figure 8. The correlation coefficients when two keys are used

Figure 9. The correlation coefficients when five keys are used
For the two key case, as shown in Fig. 8, the highest
correlation occurs for I=256. This is different from single-key
case presented in Fig. 7 since the MKE technique randomly
select keys that reduces overall correlation factor averaged
over N blocks of data. In this case, two keys are randomly
chosen to encrypt N=1000 plaintexts or blocks of data.
Assuming that attacker have no idea of MKE scheme,
correlates N*g cases (g=256) for each of the g keys with
power consumption values of N=1000 plaintexts (uses two
keys for encryption). It results in lower correlation values with
only one of the key among the two having the highest
correlation (one key match with original key in ‘g’ keys and
other key negating). Moreover, the equation (10) can be
interpreted as an average of the correlations of the used keys.
Hence, the overall correlation reduces with the number of used
keys since the average over the whole domain space is equal
to zero. Next, the proposed scheme is analyzed from energyefficiency point of view.
A. Energy Efficiency Analysis
The energy efficiency is measured as the energy consumed
by encryption engine to transmit a given message. The
analysis assumes the AES-based engine that operates on 128bit blocks (128-bit key size). In general, the AES algorithm
can be implemented using various S-Box designs, for example
LUT, SOP, etc. These S-boxes have different energy
efficiency and power correlation. In the scheme proposed in
[16] the authors utilize a combination of several different
designs in order to reduce power correlation. However, the
power consumption increases since the scheme uses S-boxes
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[4]

with a high-energy consumption.

[5]

[6]
[7]

[8]

Figure 10. Comparison of power consumption for multi-key
encryption (MKE) scheme

[9]

In contrast, the proposed MKE scheme improves the
energy-efficiency compared to the technique in [16] since it
can employ the S-box design with lowest power consumption,
as shown in Fig. 10. The comparison between power
consumption of the technique in [16] and the proposed scheme
illustrates that even with the initial synchronization overhead
(i.e. finding the first key in sequence) the proposed scheme
outperforms the other scheme. Moreover, the proposed
scheme scales better with size of the message since it allows
using the S-boxes with the lowest power footprint.

[10]

VI. CONCLUSION

[14]

The proposed MKE technique has been shown to improve
the security of AES algorithm against CPA attack while
minimizing power consumption. Additionally, it improves
security of AES against brute-force attacks.

[15]

In the case of a CPS attach, the MKE scheme thwarts a
CPA type attack by reducing correlation between power
consumption and the key. The proposed scheme, using 5 keys
can decrease the correlation by 80% between power and data.
Also, the energy consumption of the proposed MKE scheme
reduces by over 70% when compared to the inhomogeneous
S-boxes scheme while maintaining high security.
Moreover, when a single key is compromised only a small
fraction of the message is compromised thus increasing
security against brute-force attacks. Consequently, all the keys
have to be compromised before the link becomes unsecure.
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